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Abstract: A set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility
game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the
conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value
on the set of convex games.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A game with transferable utility, or a (TU) game for ease of notation, is a tuple (N,v)w i t h
N = {1,...,n} a ￿nite set of n ≥ 2p l a y e r sa n dv :2 N → R a function that assigns to each
coalition S ⊆ N of players a value v(S) ∈ R with v(∅)=0 .L e tGN denote the set of games with
player set N and C = {S | S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅} the collection of all nonempty coalitions. Shapley
(1953) proves that the unanimity games {(N,uT) ∈ GN | T ∈ C} form a basis of the vector
space GN,w h e r e( N,uT)i sd e ￿ned for each S ⊆ N as follows:
uT(S)=
‰
1 if T ⊆ S,
0o t h e r w i s e .
Hence, for each game (N,v) ∈ GN there exist unique coeﬃcients (αT)T∈C such that v =
P
T∈C αTuT.M a n yd i ﬀerent classes of games, like airport games (Littlechild and Owen, 1973)
and sequencing games (Curiel et al., 1989), can be characterized through restrictions on these
coeﬃcients. A game is convex (Shapley, 1971)i f
∀S,T ⊆ N : v(S ∪ T)+v(S ∩ T) ≥ v(S)+v(T), (1)
or, equivalently, if
∀S,T ⊆ N,∀i ∈ N :i f S ⊆ T ⊆ N \{ i}, then v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T) ≥ v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). (2)
Convex games have nice properties (Shapley, 1971, Ichiishi, 1981): the nonempty core is the
unique stable set and coincides with the Weber set (the convex hull of the marginal vectors).
Hence, the Shapley value is the barycenter of the core. Moreover, several practical classes of
games, like bankruptcy games (O￿Neill, 1982, Aumann and Maschler, 1985) and sequencing
games (Curiel et al., 1989), turn out to be convex.
The purpose of this paper is threefold: (i) to provide a number of necessary and suﬃcient
conditions on the unanimity coeﬃcients αT for the game to be convex, (ii) to show that this
number is minimal: it is really necessary to check all these conditions, in the sense that it is
possible to construct a non-convex game violating an arbitrarily chosen condition, but neverthe-
less satisfying all remaining conditions, (iii) to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value
on the class of convex games in the spirit of Young (1985).
22 Testing convexity
A large number of convexity conditions in (1) or (2) is redundant. Our next theorem provides
a smaller number of such conditions, which are shown to be minimal in the sense that none of
them is implied by the others.
Theorem 2.1 The following three conditions are equivalent:
(a) The game (N,v) ∈ GN is convex;
(b) For all i,j ∈ N,i 6= j,a n de a c hS ⊆ N \{ i,j}:
v(S ∪ {i,j}) − v(S ∪ {j}) ≥ v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). (3)
(c) For all i,j ∈ N,i 6= j,a n de a c hS ⊆ N \{ i,j}:
X
R⊆S
αR∪{i,j} ≥ 0. (4)
Proof. (a) ⇒ (b): In (2), write T = S ∪ {j} to obtain (3).
(b) ⇒ (a): Let S,T ⊆ N and i ∈ N be such that S ⊆ T ⊆ N \{i}. We prove that inequality (2)
holds. If T = S, the inequality is trivial, so assume that T 6= S and write T \ S = {i1,...,i m}.
Repeated application of (3) yields
v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T)=v(S ∪ {i1,...,i m} ∪ {i}) − v(S ∪ {i1,...,i m})
≥ v(S ∪ {i1,...,i m−1} ∪ {i}) − v(S ∪ {i1,...,i m−1})
•••
≥ v(S ∪ {i1} ∪ {i}) − v(S ∪ {i1})
≥ v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S).
(b) ⇔ (c): Write v =
P
T αTuT.L e ti,j ∈ N,i 6= j,a n dS ⊆ N \{ i,j}.T h e n






































ways to choose two players i,j ∈ N,i 6= j,a n d2 n−2 ways to choose a coalition
S ⊆ N \{ i,j}, yielding 2n−2¡n
2
¢
conditions in (4). To show that ￿ as opposed to (1)o r( 2 )￿
none of these conditions is redundant, let i,j ∈ N,i 6= j,a n dS ⊆ N\{i,j}.W ec o n s t r u c tag a m e
that violates exactly the convexity condition corresponding with (S,i,j), while still satisfying
all other conditions. Consider the game (N,v) ∈ GN,v=
P





−1 if T = S ∪ {i,j},
1 if T = S ∪ {i} or T = S ∪ {j} or R 6⊆ S ∪ {i,j},
0o t h e r w i s e .
Then
P
R⊆S αR∪{i,j} = −1 < 0, so the condition for (S,i,j) is indeed violated. Let k,‘ ∈ N,k 6=




αR∪{k,‘} ≥ 0. (5)
If αS∪{i,j} does not appear in (5), then the sum is over nonnegative terms, hence nonnegative.
If αS∪{i,j} does appear in (5), discern two cases:
(a) If T 6= S and {i,j} = {k,‘},t h ef a c tt h a tαS∪{i,j} appears in (5) implies that S ∪ {i,j} =
S ∪{k,‘} ⊆ T ∪{k,‘},s oS ⊆ T.C h o o s em ∈ T \S, which is possible since T 6= S.T h e n
α{m}∪{k,l} = 1 appears in (5), compensating for αS∪{i,j} = −1 and consequently yielding
a nonnegative outcome.
(b) If {i,j} 6= {k,‘}, assume without loss of generality that i/ ∈ {k,‘}.S i n c e αS∪{i,j} = −1
appears in (5), also αS∪{j} = 1 appears in (5), compensating the negative number and
hence yielding a nonnegative outcome.
Conclude that the condition for (S,i,j) is the unique condition that is violated.





8 conditions seems quite a
lot, until one realizes that the game itself is de￿ned on its 2n coalitions. In other words, the
i n p u ts i z ei sn o tt h en u m b e ro fp l a y e r sn, but the number of coalitions x =2 n. Thus, testing
2nn(n−1)
8 conditions is only of complexity O(x(logx)2).
43 The Shapley value of convex games
As mentioned before, the Shapley value ϕ, which assigns to each game (N,v) ∈ GN the average
of its marginal vectors, i.e.,
∀i ∈ N : ϕi(v)=
X
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(n − |S| − 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)],
is of particular appeal in convex games: in such a game, the core is equal to the convex hull of
the marginal vectors (the Weber set) and, consequently, the Shapley value is the barycenter of
the core.
Young (1985) axiomatizes the Shapley value by replacing the original additivity and dummy
axioms of Shapley (1953) with a monotonicity condition. He provides his axiomatization on
two diﬀerent classes of games: the class GN of all n-player games and the class of n-player
superadditive games. See Timmer et al. (2000) for a characterization on a third class of games.
The purpose of this section is to axiomatize the Shapley value on the set of convex games in the
same spirit as Young (1985).
Let CN ⊂ GN denote the set of convex games. A solution concept on CN is a function ψ
that assigns to each game (N,v) ∈ CN av e c t o rψ(v) ∈ Rn, specifying a payoﬀ ψi(v)t oe a c h
player i ∈ N.
Theorem 3.1 The Shapley value ϕ i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nc o n c e p tψ on CN satisfying:
eﬃciency: For all (N,v) ∈ CN :
P
i∈N ψi(v)=v(N);
symmetry: For all (N,v) ∈ CN and all i,j ∈ N,i fv(S∪{i})=v(S∪{j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i,j},
then ψi(v)=ψj(v);
strong monotonicity: For all (N,v),(N,w) ∈ CN and all i ∈ N,i fv(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≥
w(S ∪ {i}) − w(S) for all S ⊆ N \{ i},t h e nψi(v) ≥ ψi(w).
Proof. The Shapley value ϕ satis￿es the axioms. Conversely, assume that the solution
concept ψ on CN also satis￿es the axioms. For each (N,v) ∈ CN there are unique num-
bers (αT(v))T∈C such that v =
P
T∈C αT(v)uT.F o r e a c h t ∈ {1,...,n},d e ￿ne βt(v)=
maxT∈C,|T|=t αT(v). For each T ∈ C,d e ￿ne γT(v)=β|T|(v) − αT(v) ≥ 0. The proof pro-
ceeds by induction on k(v)=|{T ∈ C|γT(v) > 0}|.
5If k(v)=0 ,t h e nαT(v)=β|T|(v)f o ra l lT,s ov =
P
T∈C β|T|(v) is a symmetric game.
Symmetry and eﬃciency imply that ϕi(v)=ψi(v)=v(N)/n for all i ∈ N.
Let k ∈ N. Assume that ϕ and ψ coincide on all games (N,v) ∈ CN with k(v) ≤ k − 1 and
consider a game (N,v) ∈ CN with k(v)=k.T a k eD = ∩T∈C,γT(v)>0 T.T h e nγN(v) = 0 implies
D 6= N.L e ti ∈ N \ D and de￿ne the auxiliary game











So for the unanimity coeﬃcients αT(wi)o f( N,wi)w eh a v e
αT(wi)=
‰
αT(v)i f i ∈ T,
β|T|(v)i f i/ ∈ T.
(7)
(N,wi)i sc o n v e x :( N,v) is convex and the unanimity coeﬃcients for coalitions T with i/ ∈ T are
increased from αT(v)t oβ|T|(v), so if the conditions (4) hold for v,t h e yd e ￿nitely hold for wi.
Moreover, (7) implies that for each t ∈ {1,...,n} : βt(wi)=m a x T∈C,|T|=t αT(wi)=βt(v)a n d
for each coalition T,
γT(wi)=β|T|(wi) − αT(wi)=β|T|(v) − αT(wi)=
‰
γT(v)i f i ∈ T,
0i f i/ ∈ T.
Conclude that
k(wi)=|{T ∈ C|γT(wi) > 0}|
= |{T ∈ C|γT(v) > 0,i∈ T}|
< |{T ∈ C|γT(v) > 0}|
= k(v),
where the inequality follows from the fact that i ∈ N \ D,s oγT(v) > 0a n di/ ∈ T for some
coalition T ∈ C.S i n c ek(wi) <k (v)=k, induction implies that
ψ(wi)=ϕ(wi). (8)
For every coalition S ∈ C with i/ ∈ S, (6) implies
wi(S ∪ {i}) − w(S)=
X
T∈C,i∈T
αT [uT(S ∪ {i}) − uT(S)] +
X
T∈C,i/ ∈T




αT [uT(S ∪ {i}) − uT(S)] +
X
T∈C,i/ ∈T
αT [uT(S ∪ {i}) − uT(S)]
= v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S),
6where the second equality follows from the fact that uT(S ∪ {i}) − uT(S) = 0 whenever i/ ∈ T.
Strong monotonicity implies that ϕi(wi)=ϕi(v)a n dψi(wi)=ψi(v). Together with (8), this
implies
∀i ∈ N \ D : ϕi(v)=ψi(v). (9)















= v(S ∪ {j}),
where the ￿rst and third equality follow from v =
P
T∈C αT(v)uT and the de￿nitions of β|T| and
γT and the second equality follows from symmetry of the game
P
T∈C β|T|uT and the fact that
γT(v) > 0t o g e t h e rw i t hi,j ∈ D imply that uT(S ∪ {i})=uT(S ∪ {j})=0 . H e n c ea n yt w o
players i,j ∈ D are symmetric: ϕi(v)=ϕj(v)a n dψi(v)=ψj(v). Together with eﬃciency and
(9), this implies that ϕi(v)=ψi(v)a l s oi fi ∈ D, ￿nishing our proof. 2
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